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SUMMARIES OF ARTICLES.

[ABBREVIATIONS.—*Am. J. Ps.* = *The American Journal of Psychology*; *Ar. de Ps.* = *Archives de Psychologie*; *Ar. f. G. Ph.* = *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*; *Ar. f. sys. Ph.* = *Archiv für systematische Philosophie*; *Br. J. Ps.* = *The British Journal of Psychology*; *Int. J. E.* = *International Journal of Ethics*; *J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth.* = *The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods*; *J. de Psych.* = *Journal de Psychologie*; *Psych. Bul.* = *Psychological Bulletin*; *Psych. Rev.* = *Psychological Review*; *Rev. de Mêt.* = *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale*; *Rev. Néo-Sc.* = *Revue Néo-Scolastique*; *Rev. Ph.* = *Revue Philosophique*; *Rev. de Ph.* = *Revue de Philosophie*; *R. d. Fil.* = *Rivista di Filosofia e Scienze Affini*; *V. f. w. Ph.* = *Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie*; *Z. f. Ph. u. ph. Kr.* = *Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik*; *Z. f. Psych.* = *Zeitschrift für Psychologie und Physiologie der Sinnesorgane*, I. Abtl.: *Zeitschrift für Psychologie*. — Other titles are self-explanatory.]

Liebmann als Erkenntnistheoretiker. ERICH ADICKES. *Kant-Studien*, XV, pp. 1-52.

Epistemological problems occupied the focus of Liebmann's attention throughout his philosophical career. This led him as early even as 1865 to take a hostile attitude toward metaphysical dogmatism. In many respects his interests were similar to those of Haeckel, yet his conservative temper and his analytic methods were in utter contrast to the boldness and blindness of the latter's procedure. In his writings, Liebmann investigates the presuppositions of his doctrines, bearing in mind the specific nature of his problems, and raising questions regarding the limitations, the objective validity, and the degree of certainty of human knowledge. He makes a sharp distinction between fact and interpretation, between the given element in experience and that which has its source in reason. He insists that a scientific metaphysics of transcendent reality is impossible and that such speculations must remain a matter of subjective belief or faith. Critical metaphysics, however, or an investigation of the various doctrines that are advanced regarding the essence and ultimate ground of reality is both possible and necessary. He bitterly attacks Kant's conception of things-in-themselves and subjects many other of his doctrines to criticism, even though he maintains that Kant's achievements are both original and important and that they will prove to be imperishable. Kant took as his starting-point not the soul, the brain, a *tabula rasa*, or a Leibnitzian monad but consciousness itself, seeking the necessary presuppositions of all experiences; he demonstrated that knowledge is limited to experience and that it reveals only a phenomenal world. Liebmann argues that neither subjective idealism nor any doctrine of immanence can prove that there is no reality independent of the representative subject, because they cannot transcend the limits of the representations of the subject. In spite of his polemic against things-in-themselves, Liebmann is

firmly convinced that there is an absolutely real world (*mundus intelligibilis*) which lies beyond our world of knowledge (*mundus sensibilis*). By *à priori* we mean those functions of mind which are necessary presuppositions of our knowing a world. Kant rightly insists that these cannot be regarded as grounded in a spiritual substance, because this latter conception is itself the product of a consciousness which presupposes these forms. The *à priori* has a "metacosmic" significance as constitutive of experience, even though it may also be regarded as psychological, since the experience is that of human minds. Though not always consistent in his statements, Liebmann tends to regard the transcendental ego as an over-individual unity of consciousness that comprehends in itself the consciousness of finite individuals. Thus he leaves the firm ground of given experience for metaphysical speculation, and advances a doctrine which is open to criticism. Adickes contends that the transcendental ego is not distinct from the individual ego, but that it is the rational organization of the human mind whose metaphysical nature we can never know but which, under the influence of the absolutely real, creates for us, our world of experience. Liebmann is inclined to the view that space and time are not only *à priori* but also transcendently ideal. He confesses, however, that the latter does not necessarily follow from the former and is, indeed, ultimately a matter of personal conviction rather than of proof. His interest in metageometrical investigations is, nevertheless, due to the fact that he believes to find in them a support for his own metaphysical doctrines. Such investigations, Adickes insists, are entirely irrelevant, and might equally well be interpreted as proving transcendental realism. Although we necessarily perceive objects as existing in 'Euclidean' space, we cannot prove either that this is a purely subjective form of perception or that certain objectively real conditions, unknown to us, make it impossible that there be a different space. If we regard that which is logically contradictory and unthinkable as real, why not assert the same with regard to our manner of perception and thus conclude that Euclidean space is transcendently real? Space and time, Liebmann argues, are *à priori* because there is a characteristic necessity and universality attaching to the axioms of geometry. Starting with the undeniable fact of a feeling of certainty, he investigates the conditions under which this occurs and the objective validity that may be ascribed to it. How can we explain the immediate consciousness that our perceptions can never contradict the axioms of geometry and the fact that our subjective convictions receive objective confirmation? The writer points out his fundamental agreement with Liebmann as regards the validity of the analytical laws of thought of formal logic and the principles of mathematics and algebra. He disagrees, however, in his interpretation of the feeling of certainty that attaches to geometrical axioms which purport to reveal not the laws of thought but the characteristics of objects of perception. Liebmann bitterly opposes empiricism because he believes it to be incompatible with apriorism, yet he points out that we must carefully distinguish between: (1) the fact that if space and time are *à priori* we must necessarily perceive the world according to these forms, and (2) the

consciousness or knowledge of the validity of the forms and peculiarities of space and time. The latter alone can be the ground of our conviction of the apodictical certainty of geometrical axioms, and it is this alone that the empiricist insists must be derived from experience. To solve the problem, we must analyze the feeling of certainty. It includes two elements: (1) the conviction that I must regard certain geometrical principles as necessary; (2) the conviction that this feeling of necessity must be universal. Empiricism alone, Adickes maintains, can explain the latter element. Sensations must be spatially determined, we must objectify or externalize them, otherwise we could have no outer world at all but only certain psychical changes; the laws and characteristics of space, however, we can learn only from experience. Liebmann insists that experience can never be explained on the basis of the merely given, but that there must be certain principles which we regard as valid, and which we apply beyond the limits of actual or possible observation. Since these principles serve as connections between data that are essentially isolated, he calls them interpolation maxims. He mentions four: the principles of real identity, of continuity of existence, of causality, and of continuity of occurrence. Adickes agrees in the main with Liebmann's contention but points out that these principles have their source in the mental power of abstraction, synthesis, comparison, etc., and adds two further maxims: (1) the acknowledgment of other independent selves; (2) the conviction that we have a common sense world with them.

EDWARD L. SCHAUB.

The Religion of the Future. CHARLES W. ELIOT. Harvard Theol. Rev., II, 4, pp. 389-407.

On the negative side it may be said that the religion of the future will not be based on any authority, either spiritual or temporal; it will not be a personification of the primitive forces of nature; it will tolerate no worship of ancestors or rulers; its primary object will not be the personal welfare of the individual in this world or the next; it will not be propitiatory, sacrificial, or expiatory; it will not accept the crude Hebrew conception of God; and, finally, it will be neither gloomy nor ascetic.

On the positive side the most fundamental element in the new religion will be the new conception of the nature of God. This will comprehend in one Being the Jewish Jehovah, the Christian universal Father, the modern physical conception of omnipresent and exhaustless Energy, and the biological conception of a vital force. God is immanent in the whole universe, and especially in the consciousness of man. With reference to the question of future compensation the author answers that the religion of the future will have in it no elements of the supernatural. Indeed, he asserts that the consolations of ordinary Christianity no longer satisfy people who have their lives broken by the loss of friends. The new religion will seek to better all the conditions of life, and so will diminish the number of such bereavements; it will no longer look upon pain as expiatory, but will seek to banish it in as far as possible; and for ills that must be borne it will offer the consolation that the sufferer

may be rendered tenderer and more serviceable to humanity; but it will no longer place reliance upon the hope of rewards in a future Heaven. In short, the new religion will foster the sentiment of love and will inspire in men the spirit of coöperation with their fellows and with God for the good of humanity here and now.

As regards its progress the new religion will work in the main through channels already prepared; it will, for example, continually modify and exalt the creeds and practices of existing churches and will tend to unite them upon the two fundamental doctrines of an immanent and loving God and of serviceableness to the race. Thus the new religion will harmonize with the fundamental teachings of Jesus as well as with all the modern movements for the improvement of society.

C. H. WILLIAMS.

What is Vital in Christianity? JOSIAH ROYCE. Harvard Theol. Rev., II, 4, pp. 408-445.

The first question arising in a discussion of the essentials of religion is: Which is the more vital to a religion, its religious practices or its religious beliefs? The answer is that in the simpler and more primitive religions the practices seem the more vital; in the higher religions, the beliefs. It is sometimes contended that upon the highest plane of religious consciousness what is vital is neither the one nor the other but the union of the two. Even if this answer be accepted, Professor Royce maintains, it still remains to assign a concrete content to this conception. In the case of Christianity, he says, two opposing solutions are given to this problem of content—the one that what is vital is the doctrine of Christ as it appears in his teachings and parables and as he lived it out in his life; the second, that what is vital consists in regarding the life of Christ as part of a divine plan for the redemption of the world. The first of these, according to Professor Royce, is fully intelligible only when it is taken in connection with and as dependent upon the second; for the work of Christ looks beyond itself for an explanation. The only adequate explanation is to be found in the doctrines of the Incarnation and the Atonement. These doctrines, which are essential elements in the conception of Christianity as a religion of redemption, are capable of interpretation in the light of reason as symbols of deep spiritual truths. The Incarnation means that God manifests himself in the world and wins perfection by expressing himself in finite life and in triumphing over its finitude; the Atonement signifies that we win our union with God by triumphing over evil, and that this process is never accomplished alone but with and for each other. Moreover, in the sorrow of man God sorrows, and our final fulfilment is the triumph of God himself.

C. H. WILLIAMS.

May a Realist Be a Pragmatist? W. P. MONTAGUE. J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth., VI, 17, pp. 460-463; 18, pp. 485-490; 20, pp. 543-548; 21, pp. 561-571.

Professor Montague compares realism and pragmatism with the purpose of discovering whether they are implicative of one another, incompatible, or

neutral. Realism he defines as a doctrine that objects can exist regardless of any consciousness; it does not commit one to materialism or spiritualism, empiricism or apriorism, monism or pluralism, a static or dynamic view of reality. In defining pragmatism he discusses the biological, psychological, humanistic, and logical theories. In regard to the biological, which declares thinking to be evolved when needed, he asks: Does it presuppose an objective world independent of our cognitive experience and antedating that experience? Does it make necessary any new, subjectivistic criterion for evaluating the truth of a judgment? Does it restrict the legitimate application of our thought to the subjectivistic realm of desire and experience? The first question he answers affirmatively. As to the second, there is no reason why a new theory of the origin and evolution of thought should demand a new criterion as to the truth of the judgments formed. The objective nature of what is thought about will determine how it is to be thought about. We test the truth of a judgment by comparing the fact asserted with the same fact identically experienced or by ascertaining its consistency with other judgments whose truth has been tested previously. The third question is answered negatively. The origin of thought does not determine its content. Thus a realist may be a pragmatist of the biological type. Psychological pragmatism asserts that the truth of a belief is identical with its verification. But how could there be a belief leading to its own successful confirmation except by being an antecedent agreement with the objects experienced? The pragmatist replies that this antecedent conformity is only the possibility of verification. But there is no mere possibility, the potentiality of the verification experience must be an actual relation between the thing believed and the thing that exists. Truth is not identical with verification. The difficulty lies in the confusion of *ratio essendi* and *ratio cognoscendi*. The verification of a belief is our only ground for knowing it to have been true but not the only ground for its truth. The pragmatist fails to recognize any other objective truth than the absolutistic, while the realist holds that it may be self-existent, but yet a relation that can be experienced between things that are believed and things that exist. A realist can never be a psychological pragmatist. In regard to humanism, its realistic implications depend upon the interpretation of its theories. These the author gives as two: What world we shall know is determined by our specifically human faculties; and the world that we come to know is the real world. The subjectivistic interpretation asserts that nature is plastic; generations have reacted cognitively to it, moulding it to human needs. But what about the specific facts of the world? Are the forms of the world the product only of the human race or of all races? To assume that psychophysical organisms, by means of their cognitive reactions, created time and space, in which those reactions occurred, seems contradictory. The answer to the question, "May a realist be a pragmatist of the humanistic type," is a qualified affirmative. For logical pragmatism, there are no realistic implications; it is an ambiguous theory, lacking empirical verification, and of dubious value.

CORRINE STEPHENSON.

Paradoxes in Natural Realism. BERNARD C. EWER. J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth., VI, 22, pp. 589-600.

A prevalent notion, much in need of examination, is that realism is involved in the fatal paradox that an object can be objectively both in consciousness and out of it at the same time. Now while consciousness is formally objective, the object perceived is manifestly not in two parts of the same real space, for it cannot be shown that the facts of consciousness appear in real space. The remaining paradox may be dissolved by showing that the object in consciousness is not the same as the external object. Various theories, such as "radical empiricism," attempt to eliminate this apparent dualism. (A) Criticism of things as "independent of cognition" is typified by Professor Royce's discussion of "independent beings." By proving the impossibility of complete independence, he illogically infers that of relative independence. Relative independence of the real, means whatever non-mental characteristics we critically discover in it; it is much more than merely knowable. That ultra-microscopic facts are some being's experience, is a non-intuitive, philosophical assumption. Since the degree of independence varies greatly, realism and idealism tend to merge. (B) The paradox centers around the terms: content, imagery, awareness, and meaning. Realism may tenably identify the terms. The paradox arising from 'content of consciousness' disappears if we distinguish between real object and formal objectivity. For the sake of clearness, 'content' should always mean mental content, while 'object' should not refer to anything in consciousness. (C) The objection that cognition is partly true and partly false (from subjectivity), both cognitive and non-cognitive at the same time, sounds like a contradiction, but corresponds precisely to the fact of our imperfect judgments. There is no contradiction unless truth and falsity both belong to the same part of the percept. As realism is at present formulated, it is incomplete: but in its insistence upon certain fundamentals of experience, it is not self-contradictory.

G. W. PORTER.

Energétique et sociologie. E. DE ROBERTY. Rev. Ph., XXXV, I, pp. 1-38.

This article is a review and criticism of Ostwald's book, *Die energetischen Grundlagen der Kulturwissenschaft*. The author of the book belongs to a notable group of scientists who have greatly modified our ideas of matter and force. It was formerly held that logic differed in its laws from physics, chemistry, etc. and was more stable. We now know that if other sciences develop, so does logic, but more slowly. The most recent proof of this is found in the theory of energy. The concept of energy was first introduced in physics but has gradually spread to chemistry, biology, and sociology. The application of the same laws to all science makes all knowledge continuous. Energy is the equivalent, not only of substance, but also of cause. Ostwald claims for his theory that it does away with the dualism of older science by supplying a higher category which includes matter and force. There are certain laws or universal principles which the new logic extends to all orders

of phenomena. (1) Conservation of Energy, which corresponds to the logical principle of identity and metaphysical persistence of being. (2) Transformation of energy, in which some part always persists in its original form. This corresponds to the old law of plurality of effects and persistence of cause. (3) That A , the original energy, is always larger than B the new form. This is another form of the law that the cause includes its effect. (4) That if A equals free energy, and B , the effect, equals transformed energy, the teleological relation B/A is always a fraction. (5) As our knowledge of the properties of A and B increase the value of the fraction approaches unity. This is the formula of indefinite progress. (6) Increase and decrease of the fraction B/A is governed by the most general laws, which include those of intensity, temperature, pressure, tension, atomic weight, assimilation, dissimilation, and others. (7) When energy becomes active there is also dissipation of free energy. There is a fallacy here, however. If these laws apply to the physical, chemical, and biological modes of energy, which are simple, we cannot say that they apply to the sociological mode which is complex. Ostwald claims that man is raised above the lower animals by cerebral force alone without the intervention of any process of socialization. This is the affirmation of an effect without the cause. Man has a theoretically unlimited possibility of transforming any kind of energy into any other kind, and this is the essence of progress. The utilization of the phenomena of the outer world presupposes a knowledge of these phenomena, and this presupposes a social factor, for all knowledge is a social product—it depends on the sharing of ideas and their perpetuation beyond the life of the individual. Articulate language is the essential instrument of the socialization. From one point of view, Ostwald is justified in deriving right from force because it precedes it in time; but teleologically right is superior. The right to punish is a manifestation of right in general because it prevents loss of energy. From this point of view war and all struggle, economic or otherwise, is to be classed with crime. The idea of property arises from the primitive appetites of men. It is at first limited to a small number of objects but is later extended to include the means of production. The longer and more difficult the road in time or space between free and transformed energy, the more highly is the idea of property developed. Power retained by the state is the greatest concentration of human energy so far realized. The evolution of the state has already passed through two stages, the feudal and the economic. In order to protect itself against the menace of organized capital, the economic state ought to become the one capitalist. Science is the instrument of superiority and the flower of culture. Scientific research should come under the law of economy of effort.

HELEN M. CLARKE.

Biologie et transformisme. H. DRIESCH. Rev. de Ph., IX, 11, pp. 481–500.

This article, although containing new material, reproduces, in large part, certain chapters of *The Science and Philosophy of the Organism*, which contains the "Gifford Lectures" delivered by the author at the University of Aberdeen.

It is here maintained that every rational system should be founded on a concept, by the aid of which all the specific differences might be rendered intelligible. Otherwise it is a mere catalogue. To this latter type belongs the present system of classification in biology. On the one hand, the data of geographical and paleontological distribution, on the other, the gradation of resemblances and differences among living beings, point to a common descent. But a hypothesis of descent only 'explains' resemblances in the sense that it refers them to a single principle, namely, heredity, leaving, moreover, in its entirety, the problem of the differences and their systematic classification. Without knowledge of the law of transformation, the simple theory of descent leaves the problem of rational classification practically where it finds it. Witness the fact that at least six distinct theories have been confidently offered to account for the origin of the vertebrates. It is probable that, at some future time, an analysis of the causal factors in descent will lead to an explanation of the past history of organisms, in accordance with the principle of a truly rational system. The two great theories of descent attribute the origin of every specific differentiation to chance, Darwinism according to the inheritance of fortuitous variations, by means of natural selection, Lamarckism according to the inheritance of accidentally acquired characters. Neither theory is able to explain the origin of new organs, the correlation of parts, the harmony between different individuals, as, for example, those between the two sexes, or between insects and flowers, characters of pure systematic organization, and such phenomena as the power of regeneration—in short, the deep-seated likeness which organisms always present in spite of specific differences. These two theories of transformism have shown that systematic differences in quality, intensity, or number, may perhaps have been produced on the basis of habitual variability. The Darwinian theory is of value as a hypothetical explanation of the elimination of the individuals not possessing the character in question. The Lamarckian theory hypothetically explains inner histological adaptivity, through the inheritance of acquired characters. The sole serious basis of transformism, the concept of mutations, cannot serve as the foundation of a rational system, as its standing has been greatly shaken by the later researches. The conception of a rational, systematic arrangement loses its fundamental signification, as applied to both Darwinism and Lamarckism, since both attribute to chance the specific forms of organisms. The unknown principle of transformism should be attached, not to the materials of the development, but to the entelechy, the "essential form." A task of future biology would be to discover, beneath dissimilarities, apparently having no rationality, the truly rational system.

J. RAYMOND TUTTLE.

Autour du problème de la connaissance. A. CHIDE. Rev. Ph., XXXIV, 12 pp. 581-604.

The Aristotelian logic assures us that, whatever the matter of knowledge may be, the form must ever remain the same. Mental pathology has reduced

the pride of formal logic. In spite of this, however, intellectualism has not altogether renounced its extravagant pretensions, attributing to itself a knowledge of the very essences of the cosmos. In the time of DesCartes, skepticism succeeded in forcing intellectualism to admit that God only could pass from thought to being. This stronghold was finally overthrown by Kant in his refutation of the ontological argument. In this day the very last retreat, that of mathematics, has been seized by the neo-geometers. Intellectual knowledge is then avowedly disproportionate to the real. Must we on that account despair of ever knowing 'the truth and the life'? May there not be some powers of knowing which have atrophied by the over-development of the intellectual faculties? Many have claimed such knowledge. The visions of Swedenborg were ridiculed by Kant as morbid hallucinations. Kant's error was in spending too much time on the mystic's alleged double vision, and not enough on his affirmed supernatural communication. Mystic knowledge differs from intellectual knowledge in kind not in degree, and to seek to found the former on the latter is to misconceive both. Certain semi-mystics hope to escape the reproach of intellectualism by the use of symbols. There may be an undeveloped sense in us similar to the sense of orientation or magnetism, in the expression of which it might be unnecessary to use symbols, were it not for the fact that humanity is already saturated with intellectualism. There is still another mode of knowledge beside the intellectual and the mystic, namely, the instinctive, which like the mystic knowledge is beyond the hazards of evolution. It is also like mystic knowledge in that it is dwarfed and atrophied by the disproportionate development of our intellectual nature. The difference between instinct and intelligence is, again, one of kind not of degree. No symbols or other subterfuges can bring them together. Intelligence perceives relations, determines forms, and abstracts from life while instinct implies 'things' and dwells in life. The two words 'tact' and 'tactique' suggest a residue of instinctive knowledge in man, persisting in spite of the exaltation of the intellect. These words refer particularly to social relations rather than to the instinctive functions such as slaughter and generation. The three above mentioned modes of knowledge co-exist in each of us but they are unequally developed, thus making the human being very complex.

HARVEY G. TOWNSEND.

L'influence de l'habitude sur les sentiments. EUGÈNE MARTIN. Rev. Ph., XXXV, 4, pp. 402-412.

It is a common theory that emotions are dulled by habituation. Let us reconcile this, if possible, with the counter-theory that "emotion tends to produce susceptibility of emotion." The strength of the emotion corresponds to the keenness of the need satisfied. It should be weak as the satisfied need is weak. That this is not always true, however, is accounted for by a number of laws of habituation, in the deduction of which we shall confine ourselves to particular emotions and not emotion in general. Sensations may be weakened by prolongation and repetition; emotions, by prolongation only. The

first explanatory law is the law of imaginative vision: imagination may modify the image of perception and hence, the affective tone. The second is the law of surprise: the difference between expectation and realization modifies the emotion. The third is the law of fatigue: the dulling influence of fatigue may be avoided indefinitely by repose or change of stimuli. There are pleasures which seem dead but which merely need intellectual and emotional reinforcement. Fourth and most important is the law of attention: an emotion may be indefinitely diminished if attention is repeatedly directed away to some other element of the experience. That the diversion of attention is responsible, is shown by the fact that by attention to the feelings the emotion may be preserved. These laws must be regarded as distinct. Just as more painful and more violent sensations must become dulled by repetition, while the mild and agreeable need not, so emotions, if desirable, may be nourished. The causes of the weakening of these undesirable emotions seem to be the facts stated in our four laws. Emotional decline is due especially to diverted attention. The practical conclusion to be drawn is that the dulling and, likewise, the reinforcing of emotions is not an automatic process but is subject to voluntary control.

G. W. PORTER.

Christian Morals and the Competitive System. THORSTEIN VEBLEN. Int. J. E., XX, 2, pp. 168-185.

The morals of Christianity and the competitive system both seem to be vitally bound up with our western civilization. Taken at their best, must they be regarded as mutually supplementary or as contradictory and mutually inhibitive? "The question of their consistency with one another or with the cultural scheme in which they are involved, turns into a question as to the conditions to which they owe their rise and continued force as institutions." If they "are the outgrowth of the same or similar lines of habituation, there should presumably be no incompatibility or discrepancy between them, otherwise it is an open question." The essential principles of Christian morality are non-resistance (humility) and brotherly love. The latter appears so universally among even savage tribes that it appears to be an elemental trait of the species rather than a cultural product of Christendom. The former seems to be, in the main, original to Christianity, but the ready acceptance it met with argues that mankind was prepared for just such a principle of conduct. No doubt the force of its appeal was due largely to the protracted experience of defeat and suppression under the Roman rule. On the whole, it may be said that "these elements of the moral code which distinguish Christianity from the ethnic cults, are elements of the morals of low life, of the subject populace." The principles underlying pecuniary competition are those of natural rights, so that the period of their growth is coincident with the atomistic, egoistic philosophy of the eighteenth century. The mediæval institutions with their chivalric canons of destructive exploit gave way to the industrial institutions with the more sordid canons of workmanlike efficiency

and pecuniary strength. Yet "modern culture is fully as much shaped and guided by considerations of livelihood, as by the ideals of differential gain." Since the individualism of the modern era sets out with industrial aims, and the individual relations under this system take the pecuniary form, "the individualism thus worked out and incorporated in the modern institutional fabric, is a pecuniary individualism, and is therefore also typically egoistic." Conditions are changed. "The excellence and sufficiency of an enlightened pecuniary egoism are no longer a matter of course," and it is not at all likely that it can long remain effective. Christian morals and the competitive system, therefore, represent the institutional by-products of two different cultural situations, the former arising out of the oppressed condition of the masses and the latter out of habits of thought induced by the exigencies of vulgar life under the rule of handicraft and petty trade. The Christian principle of humility has been virtually eliminated from modern morality. The principle of brotherly love or mutual succor seems, in its elements at least, to be a culturally atavistic trait and finds its natural rights analogue in that of fair play. While the latter is hardly a competent expression of the Christian principle, it is in fact supplemented by an "impulsive approval of whatever conduct is serviceable to the common good and in the disapproval of disserviceable conduct even within the limits of legality and natural right." Under the conditions in which it arose, the rights of ownership made for equality, and was therefore not inconsistent with the ancient bias in favor of mutual aid and human brotherhood. Since, however, business has become largely an impersonal investment for profit, the principles of fair play and pecuniary discretion have, in great measure, lost the sanction once afforded them by the human propensity for serviceability to the common good. "Except for a possible reversion to a cultural situation strongly characterized by ideals of emulation and status, the ancient racial bias embodied in the Christian principle of brotherhood should logically continue to gain ground at the expense of the pecuniary morals of competitive business."

EDWARD L. SCHAUB.

La morale positive. CH. DUNAN. Rev. de Met., XVIII, 1, pp. 37-78.

In this article the writer selects for special treatment the views of MM. Durkheim and Belot, as representative of the so-called scientific or positive point of view in ethical theory. Durkheim and Belot apparently agree on three important points: (1) that morality should be rational, (2) that it should be imperative, (3) that it should make man fit for social life, *i. e.*, that moral precepts should have for their object the adapting of man to the conditions of life which society imposes upon him. Durkheim would have the right of moral command vested in society; and he regards 'society' as a personality qualitatively different from the individual personalities composing it. Belot refuses to accept such a 'society' with a morally imperative power; but he recognizes in man a 'fundamental volition,' which he regards as his ultimate duty. The opposition between the two positions thus consists in the fact that Durkheim

attributes to society the right to regulate the individual's acts, whereas Belot reserves this right for the individual himself. Dunan, criticising Durkheim's ethical theory, finds his conception of society as organic to be quite consistent. In the same way, Belot's insistence upon the necessity of an inner basis for moral obligation is not open to much destructive criticism. But the two theories present an antinomy which cannot be solved without the aid of a metaphysic. The autonomy of the moral individual and the moral authority of society would be irreconcilable otherwise. But, in the first place, what is meant here by 'society'? Is it the state, or the immediate tribal milieu, or one's town community, or party, or nation, or religious sect? In case of disagreement between the demands of these, where should the power of authority be believed to reside? This point is left very much in the dark in the 'positive' ethics. Again, it is quite inconsistent to believe that all virtues make us sociable and all vices unsociable, if one takes the terms 'sociable,' 'unsociable' in a merely empirical sense. In our society there are virtues that are vices and *vice versa*. Society merely furnishes the proper milieu for the development of the moral life: it does not create the moral life. Morality has its basis in the very nature of man. The validity of Durkheim's theory depends upon the conception of 'society.' If one recognizes the essentially ideal basis of the social order, then its development involves the moral perfecting of its members; but if one deprives society of this idealistic basis and treats it 'positively,' then its 'morality' degenerates into mere external forms of action. Dunan points out at length that the theory of Durkheim can become consistent only when one admits the idealistic interpretation of the social order, as essentially rational, as the Absolute. And this idealizing of society, Dunan thinks, follows necessarily from Durkheim's fundamental principles. In a similar way, Belot's *vouloir fondamental* cannot be mere empirical volition. It involves the rational nature of man. Ethics cannot be based merely upon the positive principles of empirical science; it involves metaphysics. One is thus reduced to two alternatives: we must either adhere to merely empirical methods in ethics, and, giving up the quest for a theory of morality, being satisfied with a science of *mœurs*; or we must preserve real morality by recognizing the inevitableness of metaphysical considerations in any truly ethical inquiry.

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